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Abstract. This paper measures the links between aid from 14 rich to 113 developing economies and 
bilateral asylum applications during years 1993 to 2013. Dynamic panel models and Sys-GMM are 
used. Results show that asylum applications are related to aid nonlinearly in the level of 
development of origin countries, in a U-shaped fashion, where only the downward segment proves 
to be robust to all specifications. Asylum inflows from poor countries are negatively, significantly 
and robustly associated with aid in the short run, with mixed evidence of more lasting effects, while 
inflows from less poor economies show a positive but weak relation with aid. Moreover, aid leads 
to negative cross-donor spillovers. Applications linearly decrease with humanitarian aid. Voluntary 
immigration is not linked to aid. Overall, the reduction in asylum inflows is stronger when aid 
disbursements are conditional on economic, institutional and political improvements in the recipient 
economy.  
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During the decade from 2006 to 2015, asylum applications in OECD countries grew more 
than fivefold, from 316,330 to 1,661,500 and are expected to continue rising. This has generated an 
intense debate on asylum permits and refugees’ integration but also, increasingly, on the feasibility 
of influencing the inflows at their source with economic policy measures. One suitable policy 
instrument is foreign aid, but views differ widely on its effectiveness and especially on its real 
effects. On the one side, it is maintained that aid helps countries to overcome the political and 
economic crises that cause the asylum inflows, and hence helps to deter them, while on the other it 
is said that aid mainly allows resource-constrained people in poor countries to afford the costs of 
migration, and hence boosts applications. 
Both views find supports in the economic literature, which provides differing answers. A 
clear example is the collection of studies on the relation between aid and migration edited by 
Böhning and Schloeter-Paredes (1994). In it, scholars concertedly try to uncover the basic relation 
linking aid and migration, but reach contrasting results (Martin, 1994). Views and studies on forced 
migration also differ. In Thielemann (2004), aid has a positive influence on asylum inflows in 20 
OECD countries during the 1985-1999 period; in Neumayer (2005) aid has no effect on applications 
in Western Europe during the years 1982-1999. Dreher et al. (2019) find the impact of aid on 
refugee flows to the world and to the aggregate of OECD countries to be initially positive, to 
become negative after some years. One reason for these diverse results is the nature of aid itself: its 
main purpose is that of improving living and economic conditions in the recipient country, and 
improved living conditions can both prevent and encourage migration and refugee flows.  
This paper measures the links between bilateral aid and asylum seeker applications from 113 
developing countries in 14 OECD destination economies for each year over the period 1993-2013. 
Given the a priory uncertain sign of the impact of aid, I hypothesise that it depends on the level of 
development of the recipient country, and use average income as a rough proxy od development. 




capita income in the applicants’ home countries. As aid transferred with the aim of influencing 
asylum inflows can unintendedly lead to voluntary immigration, I also test this potential secondary 
relationship. This paper adds to the existent literature in three main ways: it focuses explicitly on 
foreign aid as a policy tool designed to influence forced migration; it tests whether this influence 
varies with the level of development of the recipient country; and it measures its overall association 
with inflows, forced and voluntary.    
International norms and agreements outline the difference between refugee and voluntary 
migration. A refugee is a person who ‘owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons 
of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside 
the country of his nationality, and is unable to, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself 
of the protection of that country’ (Refugee Convention, 1951). Differently, a migrant is a person 
who leaves the country for any other reason. There is a grey area between the two types of 
migration, but there is also a significant difference: the refugee flees the home country to escape an 
extremely critical situation but she would rather not leave. She does not choose the destination, nor 
does the destination choose her, as it would happen in a totally voluntary setting. On the other hand, 
a migrant chooses where to move given a clearly defined set of alternatives and opportunities, 
including the destination country’s policies on immigration (Dustmann et al. 2016).  
While forced migration is as old as human history, international aid is officially recognised as 
a transfer of resources from one country to another only since the end of the second world war. The 
majority of aid transfers take the form of donations; a minor proportion consists of grants. OECD 
states that ‘Official Development Aid (ODA) is administered with the promotion of the economic 
development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective’. Hence, aid is expected to 
positively affect development.1 The empirical literature is inconclusive on the effects of aid 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The real impact of aid on growth and institutions remains elusive, as it depends on diverse factors, among which the 
incentives of recipients and donors in transferring and receiving aid. Several studies find that a substantial part of the 
aid provided by rich economies is unrelated to the real needs of recipient countries, (Boone, 1996; Alesina and Dollar, 
2000; Collier and Dollar, 2002; Lancaster, 2007; Fuchs et al., 2014; Jones, 2015).  However, there is a certain degree of 




disbursements on the economy, institutions and social norms of the recipient country, but directly, 
and through them, bilateral aid can be expected to be associated with subsequent asylum inflows.   
This study’s main findings are that the relation of bilateral aid with asylum inflows varies 
with average income in the origin country: asylum inflows from poor countries are negatively and 
significantly associated with bilateral aid disbursements in previous years, while applications from 
medium-income developing economies are positively but weakly related to aid transfers. Only the 
negative relation between bilateral aid and asylum inflows is robust to all specifications and 
cofactors. In addition, aid generates negative cross-donor spillovers: asylum applications in the 
OECD destination are negatively associated to aid disbursements from other countries. A further 
result is that aid transfers have no association with voluntary immigration. Hence, bilateral aid is 
followed by less asylum applications but has no influence on immigration. I use a dynamic panel 
empirical model with a rich array of fixed effects and specifications – including System GMM in 
levels and differences – to control for potential endogeneity and the robustness and sensitivity of 
results. The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews and resumes the related 
literature, Section 3 presents data sources and descriptive statistics, Section 4 describes the 
estimation strategy, Section 5 presents and discusses results, and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Related literature. 
A general finding of the empirical literature on the determinants of forced and voluntary 
migration is that economic factors tend to be more important for voluntary migration, and political 
factors for forced migration (Neumayer 2005). According to the neoclassical model, migration 
should respond to the difference between average income in origin and destination countries. 
Empirically, this difference affects migration in Hatton and Williamson (2005), Mayda (2010), 
Grogger and Hanson (2011), Ortega and Peri (2013), and several other studies. A positive effect of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
political allegiance of recipients was decisive, afterwards, their economic and institutional development became more 




income at destination is in Hartog and Vriend (1989), Katseli and Glystos (1989), Lundborg (1991), 
and Bauer and Zimmermann (1998). Given everything else, emigration should decrease with 
development in the origin economy. Ortega and Peri (2013) find that per capita income negatively 
affects emigration, while it only marginally influences emigration to OECD countries in Dao et al. 
(2018a). The neoclassical hypothesis is not supported in studies where the increase in migration 
appears to be boosted initially by income growth, and discouraged only after a certain level of 
development is reached. This bell-shaped pattern of emigration, called the ‘mobility transition’, is 
present in Martin and Taylor (1996), de Haas (2007), Clemens (2014) and other authors. Several 
studies evidencing this inverted ‘U’ relationship are based on cross-country data. Clemens (2014) 
claims that the pattern might hold also in the long run, a timespan that goes beyond that of most 
panel databases. Other potential determinants of migration tested in empirical studies concern 
economic factors such as unemployment and political and institutional characteristics of countries 
(among others, Hatton and Williamson 2005; Docquier et al. 2014).  
Foreign aid is one potential determinant of peoples’ decisions to migrate. On this topic, the 
link between aid and migration, the empirical literature reaches quite diverse results. Focusing on 
overall migration, Faini and Venturini (1993) hypothesise that emigration is related to aid as it is to 
income: in a bell-shaped fashion. They assume that aid consists mostly in income transfers that 
loosen the resource constraints of would-be migrants. Studies on the link aid-migration collected in 
Aid in Place of Migration? (Böhning et al., 1994) reach contrasting findings (Martin, 1994). Schiff 
(1994), Vogler et al. (1997), and Vogler and Rotte (2000) also hypothesise a bell-shaped 
relationship between aid, development and migration. Berthélemy et al. (2009), using cross-country 
data from a wide set of countries, find that bilateral aid encourages migration from the poorer 
economies and reduces it from less poor ones. Belloc (2015), also using a cross-section of countries, 
finds a positive relationship, in this case linear, between foreign aid and total emigration from South 
Saharan countries. In Nyberg Sørensen et al. (2003), aid to poor countries has no unique effects on 




economies of countries with a political crisis. In a press article, (Clemens and Sandefur, 2015) state 
that the aid-development-migration nexus is positive: more aid to poor countries boosts immigrant 
flows to rich economies. Most studies on aid and migration are based on migrant stocks. Using 
migration flows, Lanati and Thiele (2017) find a negative relationship between aid and migration, 
which holds even for the poorest countries.  
Several studies find the migration of refugees and asylum seekers depends strongly and 
significantly on political and institutional factors, such as protest, oppression, conflict and genocide 
in the origin country (Marfleet 2006; Schmeidl 1997; Davenport et al. 2003; Moore and Shellman 
2007; and Hatton 2009). Among the economic determinants, in Neumayer (2005), Hatton (2009) 
and Hatton and Moloney (2015), refugee and asylum seeker flows diminish with higher income in 
the home country; this contrasts the ‘mobility transition’ hypothesis. Other potential determinants of 
refugee and asylum flows are migrant networks; they can lower the costs of international 
movements and facilitate further inflows from the home country. In Neumayer (2004), the stocks of 
asylum seekers exert a pull effect on new asylum applicants. Hatton (2016) finds a positive 
influence of immigrant stocks on asylum applications. In Davenport et al. (2003), past refugee 
migration positively influences refugee stocks. As seen above, the empirical literature on the direct 
link between aid and asylum seekers or refugees is scarce, and results diverge (Thielemann, 2004; 
Neumayer, 2005). Dreher et al. (2019) find short and medium run correlations of aid with refugee 
flows to differ.   
 
3. Data and descriptive statistics 
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) provides standardised cross-
country data on refugees and asylum seekers since 1950, and the OECD statistics division is the 
main source of standardised data on Official Development Aid (ODA) since 1969. I built a panel 
database by using data from UNHCR extracted from OECD Statistics on the asylum applications 




Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, 
United Kingdom and United States –each year during 1993-2013. The period starts when data from 
former ex-communist countries in Eastern Europe became available. Asylum seekers are 
individuals who have sought international protection, and whose claims for refugee status have not 
yet been determined (UNHCR). Asylum applications from the list of 113 origin countries account 
for almost 80 per cent of all asylum application in the selected OECD destinations (and 70 per cent 
of asylum applications in all Western OECD countries), during the period considered. Data on 
foreign aid, regarding the ODS (net disbursements) from each donor (destination country for 
asylum seekers) economy to each recipient (origin country of asylum applicants) are extracted from 
OECD Statistics. A complete list of variables and sources, and the list of developing countries, is in 
Table A1.  
Figure 1 shows a high number of asylum applications the beginning of the period considered, 
which are partly due to the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 and decrease rapidly afterwards, with the 
consolidation of the new world order. Many refugees from the former republics of the Soviet Union 
return home, and new applications in the selected OECD destinations decrease. Another important 
wave of asylum applications – still underway and expected to last for the next few years – started 
with the terrorist attacks of September 2001 and the subsequent military conflicts in Afghanistan 
and Iraq. Substantial increases of asylum inflows followed also the Balkans’ ethnic conflicts, the 
‘Arab spring’ in Middle Eastern and North African countries, and political turmoil in countries of 
Sub Saharan Africa and central Asia. During the period 1993-2013, bilateral aid initially falls, then 
grows from 2000 until 2006, and decreases again afterwards. These turns partly coincide with 
changes of the composition of aid recipients and of countries of origin of applicants: from 2002, 
there are fewer asylum applications from Eastern Europe and more from the Middle East and Sub-
Saharan Africa. 
 




In order to study the correlations between foreign aid and asylum applications, I use dynamic 
panel regressions. The dependent variable is the number of asylum applications made during each 
year in the destination country. The base regression is:  
 
lnYodt =  λlnYodt-1 + βTodt + γOot + δDdt + εodt,                                                    (1) 
where lnYodt is the (log of the) number of asylum applications made by individuals from country o 
in country d during year t; lnYodt-1 is its value lagged one year; it should capture the influence of 
former asylum seekers on new inflows. Todt includes other dyadic variables. Among them is the 
variable of interest, aid provided by the OECD country d to developing country o. Aid should have 
a positive or negative coefficient depending on whether it provides incentives to remain or to leave 
the country and, in the second case, on how it influences individuals’ preferences across possible 
destinations.2 Another group of dyadic cofactors is migrant networks. Studies generally test the 
impact of only one network, either that of asylum applicants, refugees or migrants (Davenport et al., 
2003; Neumayer, 2004; Hatton 2016). The implicit assumption is that the three blend in a unique 
composite aggregate, defined only by the country of origin. However, in the real world these 
networks and their effects may remain distinct. For example, voluntary migrants and refugees or 
asylum seekers may reach the host country in different periods, belong with different social classes 
or ethnic groups in the home country, or hold different political, religious or cultural orientations. 
This can make their allegiance to the origin country weaker than their fidelity to their own specific 
group. Hence, immigrant and refugee networks can exert different pull effects on asylum 
applicants.3 Based on this paper’s data, the correlation coefficient between Asylum seekers, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 More aid from a country can intensify the attractiveness of the donor among alternative destinations. The presence of a 
donor in the recipient country, or projects funded by the donor, creates opportunities for contacts between the local 
population and the donor. More generally, it provides knowledge on the donor’s social norms, institutions and culture, 
which can decrease the costs of migration.  
3 This can apply especially, but not only, to countries of origin with strong internal divisions determined by religion or 
ethnicity. Political divisions may also matter. Some evidence suggests that refugees from Latin America who flew their 
countries during the dictatorships of the seventies of last century scarcely interact with economic immigrants from their 




Bilateral refugees and Bilateral immigrant inflows is below 0.3, too low to hypothesise that they are 
reunited in a unique network. Therefore, they will be included as distinct cofactors. Distance 
between origin and destination, a time-invariant dyadic variable, should capture the effective cost of 
international migration and of cultural dissimilarities between countries. Bilateral trade agreements 
between origin and destination (a dummy taking value one in the presence of agreements and zero 
otherwise) can increase reciprocal knowledge between partners and are expected to lower the costs 
of bilateral movements of people.  
Oot concerns factors regarding origin countries. Per capita GDP, the main economic proxy for 
the country’s level of development, can facilitate or deter asylum seeker inflows: higher income 
implies more resources to escape, but also weaker incentives to leave. Population accounts for the 
size of the country. Higher levels of political terror and lack of civil liberties should both be strong 
push factors (Hatton 2004; Neumayer 2004). Natural disasters (proxied by the number of deaths) 
can boost outflows (Naudé 2010; Neumayer 2005). The number of refugees from the origin country 
to all destinations except d should be positively correlated to applications in d; Moore and Shellman 
(2007) and Hatton and Williamson (2005) find that some countries are more prone to ‘produce’ 
refugees than others. Similar to bilateral transfers, aid from all other countries (all countries except 
d) can provide incentives to remain or opportunities to leave. It, however, includes an ‘attraction for 
the donor’ component that can ‘deviate’ asylum seekers from d. 
Ddt concerns characteristics of the destination country. Per capita GDP at destination is a 
proxy for expected earnings, and potentially a pull factor (Neumayer 2004). Population 
approximates the extension of the labour market. The unemployment rate signals the difficulty of 
finding a job and has an expected negative coefficient. Policies at destination concerning asylum 
seekers should also significantly influence the number of applications, but no standardised 
indicators on these policies are available. Hence, I use two proxies: the first is the rate of rejection 




pull and push elements. The second, more reliable, is an index built by Hatton and Moloney (2015) 
based on yearly changes in the tightness of refugee policies in the selected countries.   
The impact of aid on asylum applications can depend on how individuals react to the 
improved environment at home and the extra opportunities to leave. To test whether the level of 
development influences this response, subsequent specifications include the interaction between 
bilateral aid and per capita income in the origin country:   
                                             
lnYodt = λlnYodt-1 + βTodt + φ(ln Bilateral aidodt-1)*(ln pc GDP orig.t) +γOot + δDdt + αd + αο + αdo + 
αot + αdt + εodt                                                                                                                                (2) 
 
(ln Bilateral aidodt-1)*(ln pc GDP orig.t) is the interacted term, expected to be significantly 
associated to applications. However, as for the main term, Bilateral aidodt-1, no hypothesis is 
formulated on the sign of this coefficient. Wider sets of fixed effects will be used to control for 
multilateral resistance to migration (MRM): people’s bilateral flows do not depend solely on the 
relative attractiveness of origin and destination countries, but also on the one of alternative 
destinations (Bertoli and Fernández-Huertas, 2012). Endogeneity and reverse causation can be an 
issue if aid and asylum seekers influence each other. Using a panel dataset on 18 donor and 148 
recipient countries during the period 1992-2003, Czaika and Mayer (2011) find that asylum seekers 
and refugees in the destination economy positively influence bilateral aid. To account for potential 
endogeneity, I use System GMM specifications in levels and differences based on Blundell and 
Bond (1998) and Roodman (2009a,b). I also check for the suitability of instrumental variables used 
in the empirical literature on aid and refugee migration (Dreher et al. 2019).  
 
5. Results  




The base results of the estimation of equations (1)-(2) are in Table 1. The variable of interest, 
Bilateral aid, is expected to affect asylum movements from origin (recipient), o, to destination 
(donor), d. Its coefficient is not signed a priori, but I hypothesise that it is correlated with the 
average income of the origin country. The dependent variable is the log of the annual applications 
for asylum – plus one – for each country pair. Adding one allows me to keep the information from 
the zero-flow observations4. The variables Bilateral aid, Bilateral refugees and Bilateral 
immigrants are lagged one period to allow their influence to affect asylum seekers. All regressions 
include a time trend and year fixed effects. In column 3, country effects are controlled for. In 
column 4, the 2SLS specification is used. Tests in columns 5-7 are based on the System-GMM 
specification in levels and differences. In column 6, the interacted term is not included, but Bilateral 
aid is split in quintiles of the income of the origin country; therefore, its effects are linear. 
The pooled OLS estimates provide a first idea of how the data are correlated without 
controlling for country fixed effects, and therefore overestimate the coefficient on the lagged 
dependent variable.  This coefficient spans from 0.82 in the OLS specification of column 1 to 0.56 
in the OLS-FE specification of column 3. It is always significant at the one per cent level, 
evidencing that past asylum seekers have a robust influence on new applications. As expected, the 
value of the coefficient in the System-GMM specification lies between the values of the OLS and 
OLS-FE coefficients (Roodman, 2009a).   
The variable of interest, Bilateral aid, has a negative and significant relation with asylum 
applications in column 1.5 Column 2 shows that this aggregate coefficient can vary with income 
levels in the origin country: coefficients on Bilateral aid and on the interacted variable (Bilateral 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Part of foreign aid is concessional in character and conveys a grant element (OECD). As an effect of interest 
repayment, some figures are negative. However, they are a very small proportion of total observations and have been 
substituted by zeros. 
5	  Following Alesina et al (2013), the share of variation in asylum application explained by foreign aid can be calculated 
by excluding Bilateral aid from the regression of column1. This makes the R-squared to shrink from 0.871 to 0.868. 
Hence, Bilateral aid accounts for 0,3 % of the total variation in asylum applications and 2,3% of the residual variation 
left unexplained by the control variables. The latter is calculated as (0.871 - 0.868)/(1- 0.868). The same procedure 






aid)*(pc GDP orig.) are not significant, but suggest that bilateral aid has a negative association with 
asylum applications for low levels of income at home and a positive one for medium-income 
developing countries. Except for column 4, where the relation is linear, subsequent regressions 
confirm this U-shaped relationship: coefficients on Bilateral aid are always negative and 
significant, and are positive and smaller on the interacted variable in columns 3, 5 and 7.  
The 2SLS specification of column 4 is a first attempt to deal with potential endogeneity. 
Dreher et al. (2019) measure the impact of aid on asylum flows to the world and to the OECD group 
of countries by using an instrumental variable (IV) based on an index of govern fractionalization in 
the destination country and the probability of the developing economy of receiving aid (defined as 
the average of past aid transfers). I built the IV following their procedure.  In regressions, not shown 
to save space, I also added the ‘affinity’ IV proposed by Alesina and Dollar (2000), based on dyads’ 
coincidence of votes at the United Nations, but it failed first stage tests. Results in column 4, based 
on the Dreher et al. (2019) IV, show that Bilateral aid has a negative and linear relation with 
asylum inflows, stronger than in other specifications in Table 1, and in further tests this study, to be 
seen below. With the IV specification, a one per cent increase in aid transfers decreases applications 
by 0.4 per cent, independently of the level of development of the home country. Adding the 
interacted variable makes the instruments to fail the first stage tests. More generally, this approach 
shares the general weakness of fixed effects dynamic models: coefficients are biased, even 
controlling for endogeneity with 2SLS (Nickell, 1981).  
Hence, in what follows I use the System-GMM specification in levels and differences, which 
leads to consistent and unbiased results. In columns 5-7, Bilateral aid, Bilateral refugees, Bilateral 
immigrants and the lagged dependent variable are specified as potentially endogenous regressors; 
all other variables are treated as predetermined and instrumented with their own lags and 
differences. Sys-GMM results confirm the U-shaped relationship of previous tests: coefficients on 
aid and on the interacted variable in columns 5 and 7 respectively are negative and positive; 




place at an average income of about 3000$ at constant 2011 US$. The reported values of tests on 
serial correlation and over-identification restrictions confirm the validity of results.6 In column 6, 
the linear effect of aid on applications is tested in relation to different income levels of developing 
countries.7 Specifically, the per capita income is split in quintiles, and aid is multiplied by a dummy 
taking value one for each quintile and zero otherwise. Coefficients on Bilateral aid are negative for 
poor countries in the first three quintiles and positive for higher income levels. This confirms 
previous results, with a difference: in column 6 only negative coefficients of the lower two quintiles 
are significant (at the five per cent level), while in columns 5 and 7, coefficients (with opposite 
signs) and significance are similar in the two segments of the U-shaped relationship. In column 7, 
the variable of interest, Bilateral aid, is a share of the pcGDP of the origin country.8 Several 
empirical studies use this measure, as well as that of aid/GDP. Results are as above: a negative 
coefficient on Bilateral aid/pcGDP and a positive and smaller one on the interacted term, both with 
significance at the five per cent level. To test for the robustness of these results, in column 1 of 
Table A3, logs on Bilateral aid were taken without adding one. The presence of zero asylum flows 
between countries in certain years makes observations to drop by about 20%, but previous results 
are confirmed.  
More specifically, what is the impact of aid on asylum at different levels of development of 
home countries? The Total effect of Bilateral aid is the result of the sum of the coefficient on 
Bilateral aid plus the coefficient on the interacted variable, at each level of pcGDP orig.. 
Considering column 5, the coefficient on Total effect of Bilateral aid for the poorer countries, such 
as Afghanistan, Burundi, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Liberia, Malawi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Central African Republic, is - 0.051, with significance level at five per cent (standard error 0.023). 
For less poor economies, the magnitude of the coefficient is - 0.036, with significance at 10 per cent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The size of the panel is N= 1582 (country-pairs), T = 21 (years). Although there might seem to be a high number of 
number of instruments, it is always lower than N (Roodman, 2009b).   
7 I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this test.  
8 Bilateral aid as a share of the per-capita income of the recipient country decreases with the country’s level of 
development. It varies from 0.13% in the lowest income quintile, to less than 0.003% in the highest quintile. Detailed 




(s.e. 0.019). Aid transfers to countries at intermediate levels of development have no effect on 
asylum applications. They are again significant, this time with a positive coefficient of 0.048, and 
significance at the five per cent level (s.e. 0.022), for richer developing economies, such as 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait or United Arab Emirates. Results are quite similar in 
column 1 of Table A3, where logs on the dependent variable were taken without adding one. 
Results are also similar in column 6 of Table 1, where aid links with aid are split in income 
quintiles. Therefore, aid coefficients are related to the country’s level of development in all 
specifications, except in the 2SLS model of column 4.  Overall, only the negative relation of 
bilateral aid with asylum is always significant: a one per cent increase in bilateral aid to the 
recipient country is associated with less asylum applications from that country, in a measure 
between 0.05 (column 5) and 0.4 per cent (column 4). 
Coefficients on bilateral aid are small, but they report short run effects. Their long-run 
elasticities are defined by (coefficient on Bilateral aid t-1) / (1 – coefficient on Yt-1). For example, in 
column 6, where the coefficient on Yt-1 is 0.82, the long run effect of bilateral aid on applications 
from countries of the first income quintile is -0.28 (s.e. 0.13), on applications from countries of the 
second quintile is -0.21 (s.e. 0.9), on applications from countries of higher quintiles, significance is 
below the 10 per cent level. Hence, a ten per cent increase in bilateral aid to a poor country will 
permanently decrease applications by almost three per cent. Medium run effects will be considered 
below.  
These findings show that aid to poor countries provides individuals with incentives and 
resources to stay, while transfers to medium-income economies can be positively related to 
applications. More generally, this suggests that aid to poor countries has a stronger impact in 
improving living conditions than in loosening the resource constraints of potential asylum 
applicants. If the dominant force at work were the resource-constraint, then the response of inflows 
from poor countries would be positive, and stronger than that from medium-income economies. 




income between aid and asylum applications would emerge (as hypothesised, among others, by 
Clemens and Sandefur 2015). More generally, this study’s results are consistent with the definition 
of asylum seekers and refugees as individuals who are forced to leave their country, but would 
rather not move (Dustmann et al. 2016). Especially in poor countries, foreign aid can represent the 
critical support that allows people to remain, or to move temporarily to a nearby country. At the 
other extreme, aid to medium-income developing countries has a less crucial impact on living 
conditions but, by increasing the knowledge on the donor economy, can attract asylum seekers.  On 
average, they are endowed with higher levels of human capital and would face lower costs of 
integration at destination than applicants from the poorer countries (Dao et al., 2018a).     
Further findings are that both refugees and immigrant networks exert a pull effect on asylum 
seeker inflows. On average, there is a positive interaction between immigrant, refugee and asylum 
networks from the same origin country. Moreover, once endogeneity is controlled for, immigrants 
exert a stronger effect on asylum applicants than refugees (except for column 6). This can be due to 
immigrants being more settled in the host country, and hence being more able to provide effective 
support. Distance, as expected, has a negative and significant impact: a one per cent increase in 
distance leads to a decrease in applications that ranges from 0.16 to 0.2 per cent. This is consistent 
with empirical evidence showing that the great majority of world refugees move to nearby 
countries, with only a minor proportion of them migrating to the more distant OECD destination.9 
None of the origin countries in the sample is in the same region of, or shares a border with, the 
selected Western economies.  
An important result is that asylum applications in rich countries decrease as origin countries 
develop; this finding is robust to the different specifications of Table 1, and, it will be seen below, 
through all specifications in this study. The coefficient on pcGDP orig. is always negative and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Hatton (2009, p.187) reports that ‘[o]nly a small proportion of those who are displaced become asylum seekers in 
Western countries and fewer still are accepted as genuine refugees. The applications to industrialised countries are on 
average less than five per cent of the refugee stock [during 1970-2005]. Most of those who are counted as refugees by 





significant. The total effect of per capita income is shown in a separate row where the variable is 
interacted with Bilateral aid. The Total effect of pcGDP orig. is the sum of the coefficient on 
pcGDP orig. and on the interacted term (Bilateral aid)*(pc GDP orig.) evaluated at the average 
value of Bilateral aid. It is always negative and significant. Interestingly, the pcGDP of the origin 
country has a negative, strong and significant effect also in the 2SLS regression of column 6 
(oppositely to Dreher et al., 2019). This negative effect of development on asylum supports similar 
findings in Hatton (2009) and Neumayer (2005). It implies that any positive influence of aid on 
growth contributes to indirectly deter asylum inflows. More generally, this paper’s results contrast 
the hypothesis that aid transfers to developing countries, directly or indirectly, boost asylum 
applications (Clemens and Sandefur, 2105).10 The coefficient on Population orig. is positive and 
significant in columns 1-4 and 5. Regarding the destination economy, both average income, which 
can be considered a proxy for the expected wage, and the size of its population, have no robust 
effects on asylum applications.  
 
5.2. Robustness and sensitivity. 
Table 2a shows the results of testing the effects of further cofactors on asylum applications.  
Column 1 includes variables concerning more characteristics of the destination country and column 
2 of the origin economy; column 7 is the most complete specification. As expected, the coefficients 
on the rate of unemployment in the destination country are negative and significant (columns 1 and 
7). If unemployment at destination increases by one per centage point, asylum applications diminish 
by about two per cent, with significance at one per cent (column 7). Similar coefficients, not shown 
to save space, are in Table 2b. This result supports previous findings (Thielemann 2004).  As in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	   The negative impact of Bilateral aid on applications from poor countries could be compatible with a different 
interpretation if, as some studies hypothesise, the relationship between development and asylum outflows were bell-
shaped, and if aid had a detrimental effect on either the growth or level of income. I tested for non-linearity in the 
relation between per-capita income and asylum flows, as well as for the effect of Bilateral aid on income growth. 
Results show that, as in all specifications in this study, the relation between per-capita income at home and asylum 
applications is linearly negative and significant. Moreover, Bilateral aid is positively related to growth in recipient 
countries. Hence, in poor economies, more aid and more income strengthen the incentives to stay. They are reinforced 




Table 1, the per capita GDP at destination has a non-robust impact on asylum applications. A 
similar finding is in Hatton (2016) and other studies on refugees and asylum seekers. Combined 
with the more robust result on unemployment, it suggests that asylum seekers value the prospect of 
employment above that of wage levels.  
Also as expected, political conditions in the origin country strongly influence individuals’ 
decisions to move to the OECD destination. An increase in political terror and lower levels of civil 
liberties substantially affect applications (columns 2 and 7). Hatton (2015) finds political terror to 
be one of the most important and robust determinants of asylum flows. In Table 2a, a one-point 
increase in the five-point scale of Political terror, increases asylum applications by about 12 per 
cent. In Moore and Shellman (2007), higher levels of dissident violence and government terror 
increase the number of refugees relative to the number of internally displaced. The tendency of the 
origin country to be prone to ‘produce’ refugees, Refugees to other countries, has a small and not 
significant influence on applications in the OECD destination (columns 2 and 7). Similarly, natural 
disasters have no influence on the number of asylum seekers. This can suggest that people consider 
natural disasters as transitory phenomena, which can be overcome without moving to a faraway 
OECD country. A similar result is in Moore and Shellman (2007) and Clemens (2014). Neumayer 
(2005) finds that natural disasters and famine generate internal or cross border migration, rather 
than flight to distant destinations. 
What is the influence of aid provided by all other countries on the applications to the Western 
destination, d? The regressor Aid from all others includes all donors except d. Columns 3 and 7 
show that it generates negative and significant cross-donor spillovers: aid transfers from all other 
countries to o reduces applications from o in d. This can be partly due to aid making living 
conditions more bearable in the origin country, and partly to its attraction-for-the-donor effect, 
which, in this case, ‘deviates’ asylum seekers to non-d donors11. A similar question concerns the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  A world economy where countries minimize the expenditure in aid for given levels of social welfare functions and 




effect of aggregate aid – from all donors including d – on the applications from country o to d. 
Differently from Bilateral aid, the variable Total aid varies only across developing countries. The 
negative coefficient on Total aid, lagged one year, and the positive and smaller one on the 
interacted term (Total aidt-1)*(pcGDP orig.), both significant at the one per cent level, confirm and 
reinforce the above results: aid deters asylum seeker inflows from the poorer countries and can 
attract applicants from medium-income developing economies (column 4). Bilateral trade 
agreements between countries improve the reciprocal knowledge on the partner’s institutions and 
social costumes and norms, potentially decreasing the costs of migration. Hence, a reasonable 
expectation is that Bilateral trade agreements has a positive influence on asylum applications. 
However, the coefficient on the variable is not significant, neither in column 6 nor in 7. 
Table 2b presents the results of further tests of robustness and sensitivity. Cofactors are 
included in the regressions, but coefficients are not reported to save space. As in Table 2a, all 
regressions are based on the System-GMM in levels and differences, except for column 1, where I 
use the Pseudo Poisson Maximum Likelihood (PPML) method of estimation, proposed by Santos 
Silva and Tenreyro (2010), with time and country fixed effects. A potential issue relates to zeros in 
the dependent variable. They about 18 per cent of the total observations, which is not a proportion 
that should lead to biases in coefficients12, but I use the PPML estimator to check for this 
possibility, and for potential heteroskedasticity. With it, the dependent variable can be used in levels 
rather than in logs and zero values of applications can be included as they are. Column 1, reporting 
the PPML coefficients on Bilateral aid and the interacted variable, show that results remain very 
similar to those of previous specifications.  
 The empirical literature finds that destination countries’ policies and norms on the 
recognition of the status of refugee affect the flows of asylum seekers. A first, imperfect proxy for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
destination, a donor can choose to reduce its own attraction effect by reducing its aid transfers, and benefit from the 
attraction to the other donors. However, a generalised move of this kind would produce inferior equilibria: by 
worsening living conditions in poor countries, it would lead to higher aggregate asylum inflows (Table 1). Jones (2015) 
finds evidence of positive bandwagon effects, especially among larger donors.   
12  There is only one country-pair-year – in 33,222 – with zeros for both asylum seekers and bilateral aid (Denmark-




such policies is the proportion of rejected applications from country o in country d. UNHCR 
provides data on the rates of rejection only since year 2000. Results show that the variable 
Proportion of rejections has no significant effect on asylum seekers (column 2). The variable equals 
one minus the recognition rates used by Neumayer (2004), who finds a very small but positive 
effect of recognition rates on the inflows of asylum seekers to Western European countries during 
the period 1982-1999. A more precise indicator of countries’ policies on refugees is the Asylum 
Policy Index built by Hatton and Moloney (2015). It concerns 48 origin countries and 19 
destinations – including the selected 14 OECD countries of this study – during 1997-2012; it varies 
between destinations and is constant across origins. Its values range between – 4 and 11, with 
higher numbers indicating more restrictive policies. Column 3 of Table 2b shows the effects of this 
indicator of destination countries’ policies on asylum applications. The coefficient on the Asylum 
Policy Index has the expected sign and is significant at the one per cent level: a one-point increase 
in the index reduces asylum applications by about 1.3 per cent. In Hatton and Moloney (2015), 
policies have stronger effects, but their dataset comprises only origin countries with more than 300 
asylum applicants, while the present study has a more extended database, which includes also 
observations with zero applicants. To control for temporal policy shocks concerning all origin 
countries, the policy index is interacted with time dummies in column 4 of Table A3. Coefficients 
are below the significance level. 
A different issue concerns the possibility of sample heterogeneity and structural break. The 
patterns (Figure 1) and the geographical composition of asylum seeker flows and bilateral aid 
change after year 2000: asylum applications start to decline while aid transfers continue to increase. 
At the same time, the share of asylum seekers from Eastern Europe declines. The tightening of 
several Western countries’ policies on immigration following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 
2001 may partly explain the temporary decline in total asylum inflows, but other factors can also be 
at work. Hence, Bilateral aid is split into two periods: first, it is multiplied by a dummy taking 




years 2003-2013 and zero otherwise (column 2, Table 2b). Results show that the results on bilateral 
aid and on the interacted variable are similar in the two periods. Hence, the hypothesis of 
homogeneity and absence of structural break cannot be rejected, 
However, the impact of aid on inflows is smaller in the second period. This may be due to the 
same reasons that make the two periods to differ. One is improved economic and social conditions 
in most of Eastern Europe; another is the terrorist attacks of September 2001. Improved living 
conditions imply both fewer incentives to leave and less need of external aid. This weakens the link 
between the two variables. At the same time, the higher instability in regions of Middle East and 
Central Asia (Afghanistan, Iraq, then Syria, Yemen) after 9/11 weakens the impact of aid on asylum 
outflows, while it increases that of political terror. To test these hypotheses, I have re-estimated 
model 5 of Table 2.b after excluding Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Central Asia from the 
sample. This makes the coefficients on bilateral aid and the interacted variable in the two periods 
more similar. Interestingly, they become similar because coefficients in the first period shrink, 
which suggests that, during the first period, aid to these regions had the expected influence on 
refugee inflows. Regressions from the author upon request. 
Up to now the variable of interest, Bilateral aid, concerned the totality of aid transfers 
(including development, education, trade, infrastructure, other purposes, and humanitarian aid). The 
underlying hypothesis was that all aid improving living conditions in the recipient country could 
influence the choices –of staying, leaving, and destination – of potential refugees. However, it can 
be hypothesised that people in critical and extreme situations may be more directly influenced by 
humanitarian aid, which is specifically conceived for these events, than by broad transfers. Hence, a 
variable reporting data on Humanitarian bilateral aid from d to o replaces Bilateral aid, and its 
relation with asylum seekers is tested. Data on humanitarian aid are extracted from the same OECD 
dataset on foreign aid that provides the data on Official Development Assistance used above, but 
results are not strictly comparable because observations are about 50 per cent of those on Bilateral 




aid is more concentrated in poor and politically dangerous countries. Results show that the 
coefficient on Humanitarian bilateral aid is about - 0.07, with significance at the five per cent level 
(column 5, Table 2b).13 To control whether humanitarian aid is also related to the average income of 
the origin country, I tested the effect of the interacted variable, (Humanitarian bilateral aidt-
1)*(pcGDP orig.), but results, not shown to save space, on the main term and on the interaction are 
both not significant. Hence, humanitarian aid has a deterring effect on asylum seeker applications 
that is invariant in the origin countries’ average incomes.  
The long run influence of Bilateral aid has been considered above, but the significance of 
coefficients in the medium run is also of interest. To this purpose, the sample has been split into two 
parts, each comprising countries below or above median income, and the Bilateral aid variable has 
been lagged several periods. Splitting the sample is useful in order to capture the relation between 
the impact of aid and the level of development without using the interacted variable. A lagged 
interacted variable in the Sys-GMM specification in levels and differences would substantially 
increase the risk of instruments proliferation and error autocorrelation (Roodman, 2009 a,b). 
Columns 6 and 7 of Table 2b show that the first and sixth lags of Bilateral aid in poor countries are 
negative and significant, while none of the lags in the group of less poor countries is significant. 
Table A4 reports coefficients on intermediate lags. When only the first lag is considered, to a 10 per 
cent increase in bilateral aid to poor countries corresponds a 0.63 per cent drop in applications the 
following year (column 1, Table A4). The lowest two quintiles in Table 1, column 6, report a 
similar result. On the other hand, coefficients in less poor countries do not follow a clearly defined 
path: the first lag is positive, but the third, fourth and fifth lags are negative and significant 
(columns 7, 9, 10, 11 in Table A4), evidencing that the upward sloping segment of the U-shaped 
relationship between aid and applications is not robust. In both samples, coefficients on a seventh 
lag are non-significant. Because of the gradual shrinking of the sample size, lags beyond the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Nyberg Sørensen et al. (2003) state that ‘aid selectivity tends to allocate development aid to the well performing 
countries and humanitarian assistance to the crisis countries and trouble spots. However, development aid is more 
effective than humanitarian assistance in preventing violent conflicts, promoting reconciliation and democratization, 




seventh are not tested. Hence, there is a significant and substantial negative relationship between aid 
flows to poor developing countries in one year and asylum applications the following year, though 
this relationship is not evident the four years that follow. Specifications with six years lags find a 
significant negative relationship with asylum applications six years later, but this finding can be 
contingent on the lag structure chosen. However, tests on coefficients show that they are always 
jointly significantly different from zero, except for column 5 (Table A4). The balance of this 
evidence supports a stronger short-term negative relationship between aid and asylum applications, 
with suggestive but weaker evidence of a further delayed relationship requiring further 
investigation.14  
My central hypothesis, that the level of development of the origin country can influence the 
relation of aid with asylum applications, finds support in the data. However, in principle, other 
characteristics of countries could also influence the impact of aid. To test this possibility, I 
interacted Bilateral aid with two variables that have a robust influence on asylum applications, and 
in principle could influence aid effects: they are Distance and Political terror. In the first case, the 
link of aid with asylum inflows can be expected to be stronger for closer countries, with lower costs 
of immigration; in the second, aid might deter asylum inflows more effectively where political 
terror is not at the highest levels. Situations of high political and civil disruption can weaken the 
effects of aid transfers. In both cases, coefficients on the interacted variables are not significant. 
Subsequently, I tested the interactions between Bilateral aid and the other regressors; also these 
coefficients on the interacted variables are not significant. Results, not shown to save space, are 
available upon request. 
A possible further check might consist in substituting zeros for the missing observations of 
the dependent variable (about 22 per cent of total observations), and running the regressions on the 
augmented dataset. The substitution would be justified only if it were reasonable to presume that 
missing observations coincide with very low numbers of asylum applicants. However, a check on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




the countries’ sources of data shows this not to be the case. Each country’s statistics depend on 
specific practices and methods of data collection rather than on the magnitude of the flows. For 
example, figures from Canada in OECD Population Statistics are available only since year 1996, 
but Canadian sources of data show that substantial numbers of asylum seekers and refugees were 
present in the country before that time. As similar evidence is available for other destinations, I do 
not perform the substitution. 
 
5.3 Aid and immigration.  
Does bilateral aid affect voluntary migrant inflows? This question matters because aid 
transfers meant to influence asylum inflows might have unintended effects on immigrants. For 
example, aid to poor countries might deter asylum seekers but boost voluntary immigration. Hence, 
testing the association of aid with voluntary migration is useful to uncover the overall relation of aid 
with inflows – forced and voluntary –.  
Table 3 depicts the results of using Immigrant inflows in country d from country o instead of 
Asylum applications; cofactors remain the same. All regressions include time trends and time 
effects. As stated above, the general expectation is that voluntary migration is more affected by 
economic factors and less by political disruption than asylum migration. Results on the variable of 
interest are that Bilateral aid has no effect on immigrants: coefficients on the variable are positive 
in column (1), concerning the OLS regression, and not significant and mostly negative in the other 
regressions. In column (2), the OLS-FE specification includes country and country-pair effects. 
Columns (3)-(6) are based on System-GMM tests in levels and differences, where Bilateral aid, 
Asylum applications, Bilateral refugees, and the lagged dependent variable are included as 
potentially endogenous and the other variables as predetermined. Column (4) tests whether the 
impact of Bilateral aid on immigrants is correlated with the average income of the origin country. 




Hence, there is not a unique and robust link between aid and voluntary migration; this supports the 
results of previous research (Böhning et al., 1994).  
A related and highly debated question concerns the indirect effects of aid on migration, 
especially through its potential positive influence on growth. As seen above, some authors 
hypothesise a bell-shaped relationship between aid, emigration and development (among others, 
Faini and Venturini 1993; de Haas 2010, 2011; Clemens 2014). In Table 3, the influence of the 
average income of the home country on immigrant flows is positive in all specifications, but it is 
not always significant. To test whether the income effect is non-linear, Column (5) includes the 
squared term of pcGDP orig. There, both the results, on pcGDP orig. and on the squared term, are 
non-significant. Hence, development has a non-robust effect on immigrant flows. This supports Dao 
et al. (2018a), who find that income has a minor role on the upward-sloping segment of the bell-
shaped ‘mobility transition’. More generally, the results of Table 3 show that aid neither has a direct 
effect on immigrant inflows, nor an indirect one through development.  
Other results are that, differently than expected, the average income of the destination country 
is not a robust pull factor of immigration. The coefficient is negative and significant in column 1, 
and positive and significant in the OLS-FE specification of column 2. With the Sys-GMM 
specification, the coefficient is always negative and significant (columns 4-6). These results contrast 
the thesis that migration is strongly driven by differences between the incomes levels of origin and 
destination country (Hatton and Williamson 2005; Mayda 2010; Ortega and Peri 2013). On the 
other hand, the dimension of the country, proxied by Population dest., appears to be a robust pull 
factor (columns 1-6), while higher levels of unemployment exert the opposite effect (column 6).  
More importantly, push factors that strongly affect asylum and refugee migration, such as 
Political terror and Civil liberties, either have no influence or work in in the ‘wrong’ direction with 
immigration. The coefficient on Political terror is very small and non significant; while the 
negative and significant coefficient on Civil Liberties, shows that a decrease in civil liberties in the 




sum, asylum and voluntary migration differ in important aspects: bilateral aid has no effect on 
voluntary migration; higher levels of income at home are negatively associated with asylum 
applications but have uncertain links with immigration; political factors are quite important in 
explaining asylum inflows, and not significant in determining immigration. One shared determinant 
is unemployment in the destination economy: it is negatively correlated with both types of inflows. 
 
6. Summary and conclusions. 
The main question of this study was whether the inflows of asylum seekers in Western 
economies are associated to previous bilateral aid disbursements to their home countries. To this 
purpose, I measured the relation of bilateral aid from 14 Western donors to 113 developing 
countries with asylum seeker inflows during 1993-2013. Using this comprehensive dataset, I found 
that bilateral asylum applications from poor countries diminish with past with aid disbursements. 
The result is negative and significant in the short and the long run. Specifically, a 10 per cent 
increase in aid to countries with per capita income below the median level is followed by a 
reduction in asylum applications of above 0.6% the following year and 3% in the long run. On the 
other hand, applications from less poor countries are related positively with bilateral aid transfers in 
the short run and negatively in the medium run. Hence, only asylum applications from poor 
countries appear to be robustly, and negatively, associated with bilateral aid transfers. The estimated 
association does not arise from worldwide changes in total asylum flows (it is robust to time fixed 
effects), it does not arise from time-invariant heterogeneity in origin-destination pairs (it is robust to 
origin, destination, and dyad fixed effects), and it is robust to instrumental variables methods. These 
features lend substantial support to the interpretation of the estimates as a causal effect of aid on 
asylum flows. Moreover, asylum applications are negatively associated with humanitarian aid – a 
more restricted type of transfer – at all levels of income.  
As in previous studies, political and institutional conditions in the home country, especially 




(Hatton, 2015). One general, important, and robust result of this study is that economic 
development in the home country is negatively associated with asylum applications. It adds to the 
current debate on growth and migration, showing that the often hypothesised bell-shaped relation 
between the two, or ‘mobility transition’, does not apply to forced migration to rich Western 
countries. Higher per capita income in the home country is unambiguously related to lower numbers 
of asylum applications. A rationale for this result is that higher levels of income tend to be 
associated to better political and institutional conditions in the home country, all of which represent 
incentives to stay. Moreover, these findings imply that asylum inflows diminish with aid that 
promotes development.  
Could aid to poor countries be negatively associated with asylum applications and at the same 
time be followed by higher voluntary immigration? Using different specifications and cofactors, I 
find that bilateral aid has no relation with immigrant inflows. More generally, in contrast with the 
‘mobility transition’ hypothesis, the average income of the origin country has no robust relation 
with immigration. This implies that any positive effect of aid on growth would not attract 
immigration, even indirectly. At the same time, voluntary migration is strongly related to  
population levels in the origin country (Dao et al. 2018b), and expected employment in the country 
of destination. Hence, overall, aid transfers would be followed by less asylum inflows from poor 
countries and no changes in immigration.  
Other results are that aid has negative cross-donor spillovers: more transfers from other 
donors are negatively associated with the number of asylum applications in the OECD destination. 
This makes free riding potentially appealing for individual donors. However, less aid, stalled 
development and negative political and institutional conditions in developing countries rise inflows 
in all destinations. Hence, concerted aid transfers made conditional on improvements in the 
economic and political institutions of the recipient country can have stronger overall relations with 
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Table A3 presents some further robustness tests. Regressions include all covariates but, to 
save space, only the coefficients of the variables considered are reported. In column 1, the logs on 
the dependent variable are taken without adding 1. This implies that about 18 per cent of 
observations, corresponding to zeros, are lost. Column 2 includes controls for multilateral resistance 
to migration. They are: origin-time effects, which should capture all time-varying terms that are 
constant across destinations d and only vary by year and country of origin; destination-time effects, 
meant to capture time-varying terms that are constant across origins, o, but vary year and country of 
destination; destination-origin dummies, which absorb all time-invariant dyadic variables that affect 
asylum applications; destination fixed effects, which account for factors of the destination country 




effects which absorb similar factors of the origin country. This is a very demanding specification, 
where measurement is entirely concentrated on within country-pair time variations.  
It has been hypothesised that some applicants could be ‘bogus’ asylum seekers (Neumayer, 
2005). For example, irregular immigrants who correctly foresee they will not be eligible for the 
refugee status might nonetheless apply for asylum, only to avoid deportation during time needed for 
the application to be processed. To control for this possibility, I restrict the sample to countries of 
origin with above average levels of political terror. Presumably, they are more likely to generate 
flows of ‘genuine’ asylum applicants. Large geopolitical shocks, such as the Afghan and Iraq wars, 
might affect Western countries’ policies on asylum. In column 4, the Asylum Policy Index 
(previously tested in column 3, Table 2b) is interacted with time dummies.  Column 5 includes the 
Dreher et al. IV among the instruments of the System-GMM specification. Results in columns 1 to 
5, are as in previous tests. 
Former colonial links between origin and destination country might alter the choices of 
asylum seekers among potential destinations, as well as those of donors among potential aid 
recipients. In column 6, Bilteral aid and the interacted term are multiplied, first, by a dummy taking 
value one if the origin country was a donor’s colony in 1945 and zero otherwise, and, second, by a 
dummy taking opposite values. Results show that coefficients on the variable of interest, split 
between former colonies and other developing countries, are as in previous regressions; also, they 
do not differ between them at a statistically significant level. Results (not shown) do not change 
with the dummy Colonies included among regressors. 
 Balli and Sørensen (2013), find that the coefficients of interaction terms could be biased in 
settings where fixed effects are used.15 The solution they propose is to de-mean the components of 
the interaction term within the groups for which the fixed effects are included. Hence, I did de-mean 
Bilateral aidt-1 within each origin-destination dyad and year, as well as pcGDP orig. within each 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




origin country and year (column 7). Column 8 reports coefficients when the OLS regression is run 
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Figure 1. - Bilateral Aid and Asylum seeker inflows
Table 1. - Dependent variable: Bilateral asylum applications. Basic specifications. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Sys-GMM 
  Pooled OLS Pooled OLS  OLS-FE 2SLS Sys-GMM Sys-GMM.        Aid% pcGDP 
Asylum applications t-1 0.824*** 0.824*** 0.563*** 0.581*** 0.803*** 0.820*** 0.816*** 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) 
Bilateral aid t-1 -0.016*** -0.035 -0.158*** -0.403* -0.202**   -0.317** 
  (0.005) (0.027) (0.054) (0.209) (0.094)   (0.154) 
(Bilateral aid t-1)*(pcGDP orig.)    0.003 0.024***   0.029**   0.053** 
    (0.004) (0.008)   (0.013)   (0.025) 
Bilateral Aid t-1: Quin 1            -0.051**   
            (0.024)   
Bilateral Aid t-1: Quin 2            -0.037**   
            (0.017)   
Bilateral Aid t-1: Quin  3            -0.007   
            (0.015)   
Bilateral Aid t-1: Quin  4            0.013   
            (0.018)   
Bilateral Aid t-1: Quin 5            0.014   
            (0.026)   
Bilateral refugees t-1 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.006 0.023* 0.054*** 0.046*** 0.045*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) 
Bilateral immigrant flows t-1 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.062*** 0.065*** 0.099*** 0.026 0.087*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.012) (0.018) (0.024) (0.021) (0.023) 
Distance -0.166*** -0.165***     -0.164*** -0.201*** -0.169*** 
  (0.014) (0.014)     (0.024) (0.022) (0.022) 
pcGDP dest. 0.134*** 0.136*** -0.487* 0.310 0.166*** 0.214*** 0.137*** 
  (0.036) (0.037) (0.279) (0.503) (0.055) (0.050) (0.046) 
Population dest. 0.021** 0.021** -3.263*** -1.473 -0.009 0.064*** -0.001 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.430) (1.134) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020) 
pcGDP orig. -0.062*** -0.068*** -0.585*** 
-
0.334*** -0.143*** -0.104*** -0.085*** 
  (0.007) (0.010) (0.070) (0.101) (0.031) (0.027) (0.014) 
Population orig. 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.333** 0.912*** -0.0001 0.053*** 0.004 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.163) (0.333) (0.017) (0.015) (0.016) 
Total effect of pcGDP orig.  -0.062*** -0.062*** -0.537***   -0.086*** 	  	     
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.067)   (0.014) 	  	     
time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Country-pair effect no no yes yes yes yes yes 
Origin*time no no no   yes yes yes 
Destination*time no no no   yes yes yes 
AR(2)         0.002 0.002 0.002 
AR(3)         0.102 0.098 0.103 
Hansen J test (P-value)          0.084 0.198 0.068 
Hansen diff. J test (P-value)         0.52 0.945 0.625 
Number of instruments          1,010 1,057 990 
F-test of excluded instr.       14.17       
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM stat.       14.054       
P-val       0.000       
Number of country_pair 1,185 1,184 1,185 1,147 1,183 1,185 1,183 
Observations 14,099 14,099 14,099 14,055 14,076 14,099 14,076 
R-squared 0.871 0.871 0.897 0.285   	  	     
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country-pairs in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Time trend in all regressions. Corrected standard 
covariance matrix, robust to panel-specific autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. Constant not reported. The sample comprises data from 1993 to 2013. 
Variables are in logs. Columns (5-7): Sys-GMM, in levels and differences: LDV, Bilateral Aid, refugees and immigrants are treated as potentially endogenous, 
all other control variables are treated as predetermined. AR (2) and AR (3) are second and third-step Arellano-Bond test for serial correlation. AR(1), not 
reported, = 0. Column (6) Bilateral aid: pcGDP orig. split in quintiles. Total effect of pcGDP orig. is calculated by summing the coefficients on pcGDP orig. and 
on (Bilateral Aid t-1)*(pcGDP orig.), evaluated at the average level of Bilateral aid t-1.  
	   	  
Table 2.a - Dependent variable: Bilateral asylum applications. Robustness. Sys-GMM 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  Destination Origin Aid  others Total aid Aid region Trade agreem. Full 
Asylum applications t-1 0.801*** 0.785*** 0.802*** 0.809*** 0.779*** 0.803*** 0.783*** 
  (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.003) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Bilateral aid t-1 -0.182* -0.235** -0.178*   -0.286*** -0.205** -0.194** 
  (0.095) (0.091) (0.096)   (0.092) (0.094) (0.096) 
(Bilateral aid t-1)*(pcGDP orig.)  0.028** 0.033*** 0.027**   0.040*** 0.029** 0.030** 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)   (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Aid from all others      -0.042***       -0.038** 
      (0.015)       (0.015) 
Total aidt-1        -0.158***       
        (0.024)       
(Total aidt-1 )*(pcGDP orig.)        0.019***       
        (0.003)       
Bilateral aid region t-1         -0.026     
          (0.023)     
Bilateral refugees t-1 0.048*** 0.042*** 0.056*** 0.040*** 0.062*** 0.054*** 0.034*** 
  (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.002) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) 
Bilateral immigrant flows t-1 0.097*** 0.109*** 0.101*** 0.088*** 0.108*** 0.099*** 0.108*** 
  (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.005) (0.022) (0.024) (0.024) 
Distance -0.179*** -0.173*** -0.167*** -0.184*** -0.177*** -0.166*** -0.187*** 
  (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.006) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) 
pcGDP dest. -0.019 0.218*** 0.140** 0.170*** 0.256*** 0.167*** -0.015 
  (0.065) (0.058) (0.059) (0.011) (0.076) (0.055) (0.071) 
Population dest. -0.006 0.005 -0.019 0.010** 0.008 -0.009 0.004 
  (0.022) (0.024) (0.024) (0.004) (0.023) (0.022) (0.025) 
Unemploy. rate dest. -0.017***           -0.021*** 
  (0.004)           (0.004) 
pcGDP orig. -0.138*** -0.134*** -0.152*** -0.203*** -0.131*** -0.143*** -0.136*** 
  (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.019) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) 
Population orig. 0.002 -0.036* 0.012 0.020*** 0.016 0.000 -0.025 
  (0.017) (0.019) (0.016) (0.004) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) 
Refugees other destinations   0.003         0.010 
    (0.006)         (0.006) 
Political terror   0.127***         0.125*** 
    (0.013)         (0.013) 
Civil liberties   0.023**         0.021** 
    (0.009)         (0.009) 
Natural disasters   0.003         0.003 
    (0.005)         (0.005) 
Bilateral trade agreements           -0.019 0.025 
            (0.040) (0.040) 
Time dummies  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Regional dummies no no no no yes no no 
Country-pair effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Origin effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Destination effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
AR(2) 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 
AR(3) 0.107 0.122 0.104 0.102 0.106 0.1 0.132 
Hansen J test (P-value)  0.086 0.081 0.089 0.111 0.26 0.088 0.094 
Hansen diff. J test (P-value) 0.478 0.533 0.603 0.999 0.84 0.471 0.529 
Number of instruments  1,011 1,014 1,011 990 1,104 1,010 1,017 
Number of country-pair 1,183 1,181 1,183 1,185 1,183 1,183 1,181 
Observations 14,076 14,055 14,076 14,099 14,076 14,076 14,055 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country-pairs in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Corrected standard covariance matrix, robust to 
panel-specific autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. The sample comprises data from 1993 to 2013. Variables are in logs, except Unemploy. rate, Political 
terror, Civil liberties. Sys-GMM, in levels and differences: LDV, Bilateral Aid, refugees and immigrants are treated as potentially endogenous, all other 
control variables are treated as predetermined. AR (2) and AR (3) are second-step and third-step Arellano-Bond test for serial correlation. AR(1), not 




	   	  
Table 2.b. - Dependent variable: Bilateral asylum applications. Robustness. Sys-GMM, 
PPML 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  






periods Lags poor Lags other 
Asylum applications t-1 0.800*** 0.800*** 0.777*** 0.701*** 0.788*** 0.811*** 0.795*** 
  (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.023) (0.014) (0.025) (0.026) 
Bilateral Aid t-1 -0.149*** -0.246*** -0.210**     -0.081** -0.015 
  (0.046) (0.088) (0.095)     (0.033) (0.035) 
(Bilateral Aidt-1)*(pcGDP orig.) 0.046*** 0.037*** 0.032**         
  (0.014) (0.012) (0.013)         
Prop. Rejected applications 	  	   0.068           
  	  	   (0.068)           
Asylum Policy Index 	  	     -0.013***         
  	  	     (0.004)         
Bilateral humanitarian Aid t-1 	  	       -0.068**       
  	  	       (0.030)       
Bilateral Aidt-1 93-02 	  	         -0.311***     
  	  	         (0.110)     
(Bilateral Aid 93-02)*(pcGDP orig.) 	  	         0.046***     
  	  	         (0.016)     
Bilateral Aidt-1 03-13 	  	         -0.152**     
  	  	         (0.059)     
(Bilateral Aid 03-12)*(pcGDP orig.) 	  	         0.021***     
  	  	         (0.008)     
Bilateral Aid t-2 	  	           0.057 0.043 
  	  	           (0.044) (0.040) 
Bilateral Aid t-3 	  	           -0.009 0.068 
  	  	           (0.040) (0.051) 
Bilateral Aid t-4 	  	           0.025 -0.014 
  	  	           (0.044) (0.040) 
Bilateral Aid t-5 	  	           0.027 -0.062 
  	  	           (0.039) (0.040) 
Bilateral Aid t-6 	  	           -0.119*** -0.045 
  	  	           (0.034) (0.033) 
Covariates yes	   yes	   yes	   yes	   yes	   yes	   yes	  
AR (2) 	  	   0.001 0.003 0.016 0.003 0.077 0.051 
AR (3) 	  	   0.294 0.165 0.761 0.135 0.905 0.681 
Hansen J-test (P value) 	  	   0.052 0.069 0.372 0.152 0.183 0.184 
Hansen diff. J-test (P value) 	  	   0.335 0.441 0.670 0.805 0.889 0.122 
Number of instruments 	  	   939 985 864 1,035 532 454 
Number of country-pair 	  	   1,173 1,181 1,016 1,183 629 563 
Observations 14,076 11,473 13,886 7,528 14,078 6,519 5,560 





Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country-pairs in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Corrected standard covariance matrix, robust 
to panel-specific autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. The sample comprises data from 1993 to 2013; in column (4) from 2000 to 2013. Variables are 
in logs, except Unemployment, Civil liberties, Political terror and policy indexes. Time, country-pair and origin and destination effects in all regressions. 
Sys-GMM, in levels and differences: LDV, Bilateral aid, refugees and immigrants are treated as potentially endogenous, all other control variables are 
treated as predetermined. AR (2) and AR (3) are second and third-step A-B test for serial correlation. AR(1), not reported, = 0.  Constant not reported. 
Column (1): R2 = 0.759. Covariates included in all regressions.  
	   	  
Table 3. - Dependent variable: Bilateral immigrant inflows. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Pooled OLS 
OLS-
FE Sys-GMM Sys-GMM Sys-GMM Sys-GMM 
              
Bilateral immigrant flows t-1 0.924*** 0.620*** 0.850*** 0.801*** 0.850*** 0.799*** 
  (0.005) (0.016) (0.018) (0.022) (0.017) (0.022) 
Bilateral aid t-1 0.009*** -0.002 -0.009 -0.040 0.004 -0.022 
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.009) (0.067) (0.009) (0.067) 
(Bilateral aid t-1)*(pcGDP orig.)        0.007   0.006 
        (0.009)   (0.009) 
lln_asylum_plus1 0.042*** 0.050*** 0.085*** 0.072*** 0.070*** 0.071*** 
  (0.003) (0.005) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) 
Bilateral refugees t-1 -0.012*** 0.029*** -0.015* -0.001 -0.014* -0.006 
  (0.003) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) 
Distance -0.011   -0.016 -0.055** -0.029* -0.064*** 
  (0.008)   (0.019) (0.024) (0.017) (0.024) 
Bilateral trade agreements           0.008 
            (0.025) 
pcGDP dest. -0.096*** 1.171*** 0.004 -0.120** -0.087** -0.243*** 
  (0.022) (0.167) (0.050) (0.052) (0.042) (0.058) 
Population dest. 0.060*** 0.670*** 0.126*** 0.147*** 0.119*** 0.150*** 
  (0.005) (0.253) (0.016) (0.020) (0.014) (0.019) 
Unemployment dest.           -0.011*** 
            (0.003) 
pcGDP orig. 0.032*** 0.034 0.066*** 0.070*** 0.138 0.076*** 
  (0.004) (0.042) (0.017) (0.023) (0.152) (0.024) 
(pcGDP orig.)-squared         -0.005   
          (0.011)   
Population orig. 0.039*** 0.178* 0.079*** 0.108*** 0.080*** 0.109*** 
  (0.004) (0.095) (0.012) (0.015) (0.011) (0.015) 
Political terror       0.011   0.013 
        (0.010)   (0.009) 
Civil liberties       -0.029***   -0.027*** 
        (0.008)   (0.008) 
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Country-pair effects no yes yes yes yes yes 
Origin effects no yes yes yes yes yes 
Destination effects no yes yes yes yes yes 
Ar (2)     0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 
AR (3)     0.384 0.357 0.377 0.343 
Hansen J-test (P value)     0.144 0.16 0.138 0.152 
Hansen diff. J-test (P value)     0.981 0.961 0.99 0.976 
Number of instruments     1,028 1,012 1,038 1,014 
Number of country-pair     1,187 1,183 1,187 1,183 
Observations 14,024 14,024 14,024 13,981 14,024 13,981 
R-squared 0.957 0.966         
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country-pairs in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Corrected standard covariance matrix, 
robust to panel-specific autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. The sample is a panel comprising data from 1993 to 2013. Variables are in logs, 
except Unemployment, Civil liberties, Political terror. Pooled OLS: constant not reported. Sys-GMM, in levels and differences: LDV, Bilateral 
aid, refugees and immigrants are treated as potentially endogenous, all other control variables are treated as predetermined; variables are 
instrumented for using their own lags in level and differences. AR (2) and AR (3) are second-step and third-step Arellano-Bond test for serial 
correlation. AR(1), not reported, = 0.   





Table A1 - Data definitions and sources. List of countries. 
Variable Definition  Source 
Asylum seekers Log of inflows of asylum seekers by nationality 
(from o to d). Submissions made during year t.  
OECD Population Statistics, and UNHCR 
statistics 
Aid Log of Official Development Assistance 
commitments (in 2013 US $) 
OECD, International Development Statistics 
Humanitarian aid Log of Humanitarian assistance (in 2013 US $) OECD, International Development Statistics 
Refugee stocks Log of number of refugees from origin to 
destination country each year 
UNHCR Statistics 
Immigrant flows  Log of immigrant flows from origin to 
destination, each year.  
OECD, Bilateral Migration Statistics. 
Distance  Log of weighted distance, in thousand km, 
between origin and destination 
CEPII 
www.cepii.fr/francgraph/bdd/distances.pdf 
Proportion rejected Share of rejected asylum applications on total 
applications in country d from country o at time 
t. 
UNHCR Statistics 
Asylum Policy Index Log of composite index of policies concerning 
refugee status recognition. Varies between 1 and 
16, with higher numbers indicating more 
restrictive policies 
Hatton Moloney (2016) 
Population orig. / dest. Log of number of people in country o, d. World Bank - World Development Indicators 
pc GDP orig. / dest. Log of per capita Gross Domestic Product in 
country o, d. Constant 2005 US$. 
World Bank - World Development Indicators 
Political terror  Scale from 1 to 5. Higher numbers indicate 
higher levels of political terror.  
The Political Terror Scale. 
http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/ 
Civil liberties  Rating from 1 to 7:  1 represents the highest and 









Unemployment rate in destination country International Labour Statistics. 
Bilateral Trade 
agreements 
Bilateral preferential trade agreements, average 
of WTO-plus. Varies between 0 (no agreement) 
and 1 (agreement). 
  
World Trade Organization. Preferential Trade 
Agreements. 
Origin countries. Europe: Albania,  Bosnia-Herzegovina,  Belarus, Moldova, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Turkey, Ukraine; North Africa: Libya, Morocco, 
Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia; South of Sahara: Angola, Benin, Burundi, Burkina Faso, Botswana, Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Comoros, Congo 
Democratic Rep., Congo Cape Verde, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Chad, Togo, Tanzania, Uganda, South Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Liberia, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, Malawi, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria; South and Central Asia: Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Georgia, India, 
Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan; Middle East: United Arab Emirates, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, Kuwait; Far East Asia: China, Indonesia, Cambodia, Laos, Mongolia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Papua 
New Guinea; South America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Guyana, Peru, Venezuela, Ecuador; North and Central America: Cuba, Dominica,  
Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, Haiti,  Jamaica, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Trinidad and Tobago. Destination countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, 





	   	  
 
Table A2  - Summary statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      Bilateral aid (mil constant  US$) 27,875 29.1 133.4 0 13021.8 
Aid from all others (mil. constant US$) 31,976 667.8 1,038.4 2.4 25,330.1 
Humanitarian aid (mil. constant  US$) 11,830 6.6 30.8 0 823.6 
Asylum seekers 27,184 230 1,120.5 0 75,138 
Refugees 21,148 1,333.4 7,583.1 1 350,000 
Immigrant inflows 27,651 1,402.6 5,431.3 0 165,000 
Distance 33,222 7,099 3,468 491.8 18,008.3 
pc_GDP origin (constant 2005 US$) 31,990 2,656 5,019.8 68.6 46856.8 
Population origin (mil.) 33,194 44.00 159.4 0.1 1357.4 
Refugees other  destinations 32,858 89,473 312,136 0 3809767 
Natural disasters (total deaths) 25,060 817.34 8,133.5 0 229566 
Proportion rejected 22,148 58.22 3.34 53.1 63.98 
Asylum Policy Index 26,894 7.15 2.85 1 16 
Political terror 32,536 2.97 0.95 1 5 
Civil liberties 32,816 4.38 1.53 1 7 
pc_GDP destination (constant 2005 US$) 33,222 37,551 9,251 19,448 69,094.8 
Population destination (mil.) 33,222 50.02 70.98 4.3 316.5 
Unemployment r. destination 33,222 7.58 3.50 2.5 26.1 
	  
Table A3. - Dependent variable: Bilateral asylum inflows 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)	   (7) (8)	  
  Sys-GMM 
ln asylum  MRM 
Sys-GMM 
High PT 








  API*dt Colonies de-mean No outliers 
Asylum applications t-1 0.786*** 0.476*** 0.753*** 0.555*** 0.803*** 0.847*** 0.736*** 0.827*** 
  (0.017) (0.008) (0.019) (0.011) (0.014) (0.018) (0.014) (0.007) 
Bilateral Aid t-1 -0.224** -0.090 -0.188* -0.216*** -0.220**   -0.177** -0.045* 
  (0.090) (0.057) (0.102) (0.055) (0.093)   (0.072) (0.026) 
(Bilateral Aidt-1)*(pcGDP orig.) 0.032** 0.014* 0.025* 0.033*** 0.031**   0.027*** 0.004 
  (0.013) (0.008) (0.014) (0.008) (0.013)   (0.010) (0.004) 
Bilateral Aid*Colonies t-1           -0.224**     
            (0.113)     
(Bil. Aid Colonies t-1)*(pcGDP orig.)           0.036**     
          (0.016)     
Bilateral Aid*No colonies t-1           -0.264**     
            (0.121)     
(Bil. Aid No colonies t-1)*(pcGDP orig.)           0.040**     
          (0.016)     
(Asylum Policy Index)*dt       -0.006         
        (0.007)         
Covariates yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Time effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Country effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes no 
AR(2) 0.007       0.002 0.002 0.003   
AR(3) 0.319       0.102 0.104 0.093   
Hansen J test (P-value)  0.212       0.089 0.937 0.192   
Hansen diff. J test (P-value) 0.124       0.495 0.955 0.894   
Number of instruments  990       1012 542 1000   
Number of country-pair 1,105 1,172 1,086   1,183 1,185 1,183   
Observations 11,581 14,099 9,502 13,907 14,076 14,099 14,076 14015 
R-squared 
 
0.931   0.896       0.874 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country-pairs in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Corrected standard covariance matrix, robust to panel-
specific autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. The sample comprises data from 1993 to 2013. Variables are in logs, except Asylum Policy Index (API). Sys-
GMM, in levels and differences: LDV, Bilateral aid, refugees and immigrants are treated as potentially endogenous, all other control variables are treated as 
predetermined. AR (2) and AR (3) are second and third-step Arellano-Bond test for serial correlation. AR(1), not reported, = 0.  Column (1) logs on Bilateral 
asylum, not +1. Column (2) also includes country*time effects. Constant and covariates not reported. 
	  
Table A4.- Dependent variable: Asylum applications. Further lags. Sys-GMM 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
  Per-capita income < median 	  	   Per-capita income >  median 
                            
Asylum applications t-1 0.807*** 0.802*** 0.820*** 0.810*** 0.832*** 0.811*** | 0.818*** 0.813*** 0.798*** 0.778*** 0.783*** 0.795*** 
  (0.022) (0.023) (0.021) (0.024) (0.023) (0.025) | (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) 
Bilateral aid t-1 -0.063*** -0.088*** -0.089*** -0.075** -0.083** -0.081** | 0.053** 0.052* 0.051 0.055 -0.010 -0.015 
  (0.020) (0.033) (0.034) (0.035) (0.036) (0.033) | (0.022) (0.031) (0.032) (0.034) (0.033) (0.035) 
Bilateral aid t-2   0.045 0.041 0.032 0.037 0.057 |   0.006 0.048 0.063 0.068 0.043 
    (0.033) (0.042) (0.043) (0.044) (0.044) |   (0.031) (0.038) (0.042) (0.044) (0.040) 
Bilateral aid t-3     0.010 0.030 0.032 -0.009 |     -0.088** -0.023 0.072 0.068 
      (0.034) (0.040) (0.042) (0.040) |     (0.035) (0.048) (0.046) (0.051) 
Bilateral aid t-4       -0.047 -0.006 0.025 |       -0.093*** -0.038 -0.014 
        (0.036) (0.046) (0.044) |       (0.030) (0.039) (0.040) 
Bilateral aid t-5         -0.017 0.027 |         -0.088** -0.062 
          (0.035) (0.039) |         (0.036) (0.040) 
Bilateral aid t-6           -0.119*** |           -0.045 
            (0.034) |           (0.033) 
Covariates yes yes yes yes yes yes | yes yes yes yes yes yes 
AR (2) 0.035 0.052 0.065 0.103 0.09 0.077 | 0.025 0.033 0.032 0.039 0.062 0.071 
AR (3) 0.401 0.413 0.309 0.284 0.287 0.905 | 0.088 0.095 0.179 0.333 0.396 0.657 
Hansen J-test (P value) 0.34 0.303 0.195 0.217 0.167 0.183 | 0.185 0.254 0.2 0.196 0.159 0.205 
Number of instruments 603 602 583 571 554 532 | 515 507 499 489 474 461 
Number of country-pair 678 668 660 652 635 629 | 625 612 591 583 575 563 
Observations 7,507 7,346 7,184 7,032 6,877 6,519 | 6,592 6,362 6,172 6,014 5,853 5,560 
F(num., den.)   4.27 2.96 2.47 1.65 4.37 |   3.62 3.21 4.73 2.81 1.81 
P>F   0.014 0.031 0.043 0.144 0.0002 |   0.027 0.023 0.0009 0.016 0.095 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country-pairs in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Corrected standard covariance matrix, robust to panel-specific autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity. The sample comprises data from 1993 to 2013; in column (4) from 2000 to 2013. Variables are in logs. Time, country-pair and origin and destination effects in all regressions. Sys-GMM, 
in levels and differences: LDV, Bilateral aid, refugees and immigrants are treated as potentially endogenous, all other control variables are treated as predetermined. AR (2) and AR (3) are second and third-
step A-B test for serial correlation. AR(1), not reported, = 0. Covariates  not reported.  
	  
